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H
ow useful monetary aggregates are for the conduct of monetary
policy is a long-standing question. We analyze this question by
examining their role as information variables in situations where
the monetary authority uses an interest rate instrument. Monetary aggregates
may be useful in that context if they contain information about the underlying
contemporaneous state of the economy by helping to predict imperfectly ob-
servedvariablesthatappearinthepolicymaker’sreactionfunction. Thisuseof
moneygenerallyrequiresthatthedemandformoneybewellbehavedandthat
random movements in the money demand function do not severely reduce the
signalcontentofmoney. Alternatively, ifthepolicyruleinvolvesexpectations
of future variables, then money may be useful for predicting those variables.1
Analyzing money’s usefulness requires a very different statistical analysis for
each of these two roles. The ﬁrst role deals with the stability of the money
demand relationship and the precision with which the money demand curve
can be estimated, while the second role deals with the usefulness of money
for forecasting.
While in practice monetary authorities do use monetary aggregates as
information variables, their use varies over institutions and over time. For
example, Hetzel (1981) indicates that the behavior of M1-inﬂuenced Federal
Reserve policy decisions over part of the 1970s and Dotsey (1996) provides
We have beneﬁted from a number of helpful discussions with Yash Mehra and Mark Wat-
son. Bob Hetzel, Pierre Sarte, and Alex Wolman made many useful suggestions. The views
expressed herein are the authors’ and do not represent the views of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.
1 For recent discussions of the role of forecasts in monetary policy, see Svensson (1999),
Woodford (1999), and Amato and Laubach (2000).
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evidence that money played a role during the early 1980s. The behavior of
money, however, does not always enter into policy deliberations. Currently,
mostFOMCparticipantspaylittleattentiontothegrowthrateofthemonetary
aggregates.2 The time-varying use of money could be related to its time-
varying usefulness. We here explore how money’s behavior and predictive
content have changed over time.
We do this in two ways. First, we analyze both the long-run and short-run
behavior of M1 and M2 in Sections 1 and 2. We ﬁnd that the parameters of
the money demand function are time-varying and that our ability to explain
money demand also varies over time. In Section 3, we look at how useful
money is for forecasting nominal income, real output, and inﬂation. Our
analysis indicates that M1 has been periodically useful in helping to forecast
economic activity, but that its usefulness has waned. M2, on the other hand,
hasfairlyconsistentlyhelpedforecastnominalGDPandonoccasionhasbeen
useful in improving the forecasts of real GDP. Section 4 concludes.
1. LONG-RUN RELATIONSHIP
We ﬁrst examine the long-run relationship between money, income, prices,
and interest rates. This investigation is important because it indicates the
correct statistical speciﬁcations needed for the analysis in the rest of the ar-
ticle. If money, income, prices, and interest rates are cointegrated, then the
empirical work that analyzes the demand for money and the predictive con-
tent that money has for future output growth and inﬂation must take account
of the cointegrating relationship. Failure to do so will result in an improper
speciﬁcation of the empirical model.
The ﬁrst step in any such investigation is to determine the order of inte-
gration of the relevant variables. These variables are: nominal M1; nominal
M2; nominal GDP; real GDP; inﬂation as measured by changes in the GDP
deﬂator;thethreemonthTreasurybillrate;andtheopportunitycostofholding
M2, which is given by the difference between the T-bill rate and the own rate
paid on M2 balances, real M1 balances, and real M2 balances. All variables
with the exception of inﬂation and the two interest rate measures are meas-
ured in logs, and our sample goes from 1959:II through 2000:I. Other than
the opportunity cost, all variables are nonstationary in levels. The stationarity
of the opportunity cost reﬂects the cointegration between the T-bill rate and
M2’s own rate. It is not surprising that these two variables would exhibit a
long-run relationship.
2A reading of recent policy discussions summarized in the regularly released minutes of
FOMC meetings indicates that very little weight is placed on the behavior of money in the setting
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5 percent critical value −2.91 −3.45 −3.89
Wethenexaminewhetherﬁrstdifferencesofthevariablesarestationaryor
if the variables are integrated of order one. The results of augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) tests are displayed in Table 1.3 Values of the test statistic that
are less than the critical value indicate rejection of the null hypothesis that the
variable is integrated. The lag lengths were chosen by the step-down method
advocatedinNgandPerron(1995). Whenatrendorquadratictrendvariableis
signiﬁcant in the regressions, test statistics are included for that speciﬁcation.
With the exception of nominal M2 growth and inﬂation, all the variables seem
to be integrated of order one. Importantly, real M1 (m1) and real M2 (m2)
are integrated of order one, and these variables will be used to investigate
cointegration.
Theresultsofourunitroottests,displayedinTable1,arefairlystandard. It
is, however, worth presenting them since our sample size is somewhat larger
than most reported studies. For example, given the recent move of many
monetary authorities to explicitly or implicitly target inﬂation, one would
expect inﬂation to eventually exhibit stationary behavior. It is worth checking
to see if the professed change in emphasis on controlling inﬂation has shown
up in the statistical characterization of nominal variables.
Cointegration
Wenowwishtolookatthecointegratingrelationshipbetweenrealmoneybal-
ances, real income, and nominal interest rates. The two behavioral equations
that inform our investigation are fairly standard speciﬁcations of the long-run
relationship between real money balances, income, and interest rates:
3All unit root and cointegration tests were performed using the ADF, CADF, and PS proce-
dures in the Gauss module, Coint written by Ouliaris and Phillips (1994–1995). These procedures
produce the value of the relevant test statistic and its critical values.26 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
m1t = a + byt − cRt + et (1.1)
and
m2t = α + βyt − γR t − δ(Rt − RM2
t ) + εt. (1.2)
Equation (1.1) displays a simple demand function for real M1 balances as a
function of real GDP and the nominal interest rate. Equation (1.2) depicts the
demand for real M2 balances as a function of these same variables, as well
as the opportunity cost of holding balances that are in M2 but not in M1. As
mentioned, the money variables and output are in logs.
Before formally testing for cointegration we perform a heuristic exercise
to examine the autoregressive behavior of the series. First, we recursively
estimate a dynamic OLS regression of the respective real monetary aggregate
on real GDP and the nominal interest rate. We use dynamic OLS, which
includes leads and lags of ﬁrst differences of the explanatory variables, to
correct for correlation between the residual in the cointegrating relationship
and the residuals in the processes generating the explanatory variables. The
errors from the regression are computed as mt −ˆ a − ˆ byt +ˆ cRt for each
deﬁnition of money. We then look at the sum of coefﬁcients on a fourth order
autoregression of this error; this sum can be thought of as the ˆ ρ −1 part of the
Dickey-Fuller test statistic, T(ˆ ρ −1). This sum is plotted in panels b and f of
Figure 1. The sum is informative because it indicates the size of ρ,although
no conﬁdence intervals are calculated. One can see that the autocorrelation
of the M1 residual declines over much of the sample, and as the sample size
increases, it is likely that M1 will be judged to be cointegrated. The opposite
is true of M2.
Thereareanumberofissuesinvolvedinthevarioustestsforcointegration
proposed in the literature. Because the effect of the interest rate in money de-
mand equations is generally small (as indicated in panels a and e of Figure 1),
the presence of cointegration largely involves money’s behavior with respect
to output. Output is partially governed by a trend and partially governed by
a nontrend nonstationary component. The various tests emphasize only one




of sum of the coefﬁcients in a fourth order autocorrelation are informative.
When testing for cointegration, one must take a stand on what portion
of output is most important. In conducting augmented Dickey-Fuller tests,
we assume the trend is the most important portion of output and follow the
methodology advocated in Hamilton (1994, p. 597). First we perform aux-
iliary regressions of the interest rate and money on output. Of these twoDotsey, Lantz, Santucci: Conduct of Monetary Policy 27
Figure 1 Cointegrating Results
regressions, we then take the residual from the second (money) regression,
and regress it on a constant, the residual from the auxiliary interest rate
regression, and a time trend. Using the residual from this regression, we28 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
conduct an ADF test (see panels c and g of Figure 1). A test statistic that is





that are appropriate for an individual test with a speciﬁc end date. Our tests
only show what a researcher testing for cointegration at a speciﬁc date would
ﬁnd.
An alternate test for cointegration commonly performed in the literature
is the Johansen (1988) maximum eigenvalue test (see panels d and h of Figure
1).4 Here a test statistic above the critical value indicates that the variables are
cointegrated. For both M1 and M2 the test produces results that are somewhat
at odds with theADF tests. For example, the Johansen test indicates that M1
was only cointegrated in the mid-1980s and is not cointegrated at present.
It also indicates cointegration in the late 1970s. Given the behavior of the
autocorrelation coefﬁcient, the results appear counterintuitive. The autocor-
relation coefﬁcient for the error correction term has been relatively low in the
1990s, which should increase the likelihood that no cointegration among the
variables will be rejected. Regarding M2, the Johansen test indicates cointe-
gration, but shows that cointegration was not nearly so uniformly present in
the1980s. Bothtestsdo, however, indicatecointegrationinthelate1980sand
early 1990s.
Stability
In our analysis of the long-run relationships’stability, the recursive estimates
of the coefﬁcients in the dynamic OLS regression on M1 seem to settle down
as the sample size increases. More formal tests for parameter stability are
conducted using the SupF and MeanF statistical tests developed in Hansen
(1992).5 For both tests the null hypothesis is that the coefﬁcients are constant.
The SupF test tests against the alternative of a single structural break at an
unknown break date, while the MeanF test tests against the alternative: that
the coefﬁcients follow a martingale. The SupF test performs an F test for a
structural break at each point on an interior interval of the data sample. The
interval is chosen to allow sufﬁcient sample size for constructing the F test.
We can calculate the distribution of the supremum of the F test and derive
a test statistic. Similarly, we can derive a distribution for the mean of the
F-statistics. The SupF test rejects stability at the 1 percent signiﬁcance level
and the MeanF test rejects at the 10 percent signiﬁcance level. The rejections
4 The Johansen tests were conducted using the SJ procedure in the Gauss Coint package with
a speciﬁcation of a trend and six lags.
5 We wish to thank Bruce Hansen for making available the code for performing these tests.Dotsey, Lantz, Santucci: Conduct of Monetary Policy 29
occur largely because of a sharp spike in the F-statistic in late 1980 and early
1981.
The coefﬁcient on income in the M2 speciﬁcation seems to be drifting
downward while the coefﬁcient on the T-bill has been increasing. It currently
is positive, which makes little theoretical sense. Stability is, however, only
rejected by the MeanF test at the 10 percent signiﬁcance level.
Comparability of Results
Our results on cointegration are in agreement with a number of studies in this
area. Stock and Watson (1989) reject cointegration for M1 using monthly
data over the sample 1960:2 to 1985:12, which is consistent with our results
since only after 1996 with the ADF test do we ﬁnd cointegration at the 5
percent signiﬁcance level. Our results are also consistent with the ﬁndings in
Friedman and Kuttner (1992), who do not ﬁnd that M1 is cointegrated over
a sample ending in 1990:4, and with their ﬁnding for cointegration for M1
over the sample 1960:2 through 1979:2 if one employs Johansen’s procedure,
which they do. Miyao (1996), however, indicates that the Johansen test may
overstate the ﬁnding of cointegration.
RegardingM2, FriedmanandKuttnerﬁndcointegrationovertheirshorter
sample, but only ﬁnd evidence for cointegration for M2 at the 10 percent
level over their entire sample, which ends in 1990:4. Given that they employ
Johansen’s method, their results are broadly consistent with ours. Like us,
MiyaoﬁndsnoevidenceofcointegrationforM2overhisentiresample,1959:1
to1993:4,buthealsofailstouncoverevidenceforcointegrationoverhisearlier
subsamples when using both ADF and Johansen test statistics. His tests on
earlier samples, which end in 1988:4 and 1990:4, are at odds with ours since
we fail to reject the null at 10 percent signiﬁcance levels. Our results are
in greater agreement with those of Carlson et al. (2000), who ﬁnd that M2
is cointegrated until about 1990. Swanson (1998), on the other hand, ﬁnds
evidenceforcointegrationforbothM1andM2overtheperiod1960:2through
1985:12 using Johansen’s methodology. His results are consistent with our
M1 result, but not our M2 result. He uses monthly data, and it could be that
samplingfrequencyisimportantforthetestresults, especiallythoseinvolving
M2. Lastly,ourresultsareconsistentwiththoseofFeldsteinandStock(1994),
who ﬁnd that M2 velocity is cointegrated with the nominal interest rate. The
coefﬁcient on income elasticity is very close to one in the 1980s and early
1990s, so constraining it to be one as they do does not signiﬁcantly affect the
test results.
On the basis of our results and for conciseness, we choose to treat both
M1 and M2 as cointegrated and include the estimated error correction term
in the empirical work of the next two sections. We realize that the evidence
in favor of cointegration is not overwhelming: that the evidence varies with30 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
sampleperiods,methodology,anddatafrequency. Wethereforeindicatethose
instances where our results are sensitive to the presence of an error correction
term.
2. THE DEMAND FOR MONEY
We next investigate the time-varying behavior of the demand for money in
order to shed light on whether the current behavior of money contains infor-
mation useful to the monetary authority for controlling nominal income or
inﬂation. This question is related to the desirability of monetary targeting.
As emphasized by Friedman (1969), a well-deﬁned and stable money demand
curveisanecessaryconditionformonetarytargetingtoproducedesirableeco-
nomic outcomes, thus his emphasis on understanding the demand for money.
Evenifonedoesnotwishtousemoneyasaninstrumentorintermediatetarget,
the current behavior of money may provide useful information about imper-
fectly observed variables such as current output or inﬂation. The usefulness
of this information is related to understanding the demand for money, and we
therefore share the same emphasis.
Lately the literature has moved away from this approach and has instead
emphasized the notion of Granger causality. Recent examples include Fried-
manandKuttner(1992),EstrellaandMishkin(1997),andFeldsteinandStock
(1994). Thosepapersarguethatinorderformoneytobeusefulintheconduct
of monetary policy, it must have predictive content for some variable that the
monetary authority cares about.
Money as a Signal
We believe the foregoing view is too restrictive. It neglects the signal value
that money may have for contemporaneous and lagged values of economic
variables that could plausibly be of interest to the central bank.6 In reality,
output and prices are not contemporaneously observable and are at best im-
perfectly observed with a lag. It may very well be that these variables, like
the underlying shocks that impact the economy, may never be fully observed.
In this case an optimizing monetary authority may ﬁnd it desirable to use the
economicinformationcontainedinmoneywhensettingitsinterestrateinstru-
ment. This point is made in Dotsey and Hornstein (2000), who consider the
case of optimal time-consistent monetary policy. Their analysis would carry
over to the study of optimal policy when the central bank is fully credible, or
6 Furthermore, the notion of Granger causality involves general equilibrium considerations as
pointed out in Dotsey and Otrok (1994). Since we are primarily concerned with money’s usefulness
when the central bank employs an interest rate rule we do not belabor these earlier points. Instead
we concentrate on the contemporaneous signal value of money.Dotsey, Lantz, Santucci: Conduct of Monetary Policy 31
to a situation where the central bank was following a feedback rule that pos-
sessed desirable properties across a wide range of models. Using money as
a signal of underlying state variables or of endogenous variables that may be
part of some feedback rule could be helpful depending on how good a signal
moneyisinpractice. Thevalueofthatsignalisdirectlyrelatedtothebehavior
of the demand for money.
To be more speciﬁc, consider a case where the monetary authority is
following a rule in which the nominal interest rate target depends on output
whose true value is never fully observed. Also, for simplicity assume that
all variables are stationary and that output is the only endogenous variable
not observed. That is, the price level, the interest rate, and nominal money
are known. Simultaneously observing nominal M1, prices, and the nominal
interest rate conveys the following signal,
sm = (ˆ a − a)+ b(yt −¯ y)+ (ˆ b − b)y − (ˆ c − c) ¯ R + et,
whereabaroveravariableindicatesthevariable’smeanandahatindicatesan
estimate of the parameter.7 The monetary authority would in this case employ
the Kalman ﬁlter to update its inference of output using the above signal. The
precision of that estimate would depend on the variance of the money demand
disturbance, which is directly related to how well money demand is behaved.
It would also depend on the variance of the parameter estimates in the money
demand regression.8 In a case where the demand for money is stable, the
variance of the parameters would get arbitrarily small as the sample size got
larger. As more data were acquired, the estimation of the parameters would
become more precise. Consequently, the signal content of money would then
depend on whether one could well explain its current behavior. In a case
where parameter estimates are time varying and unstable, the variance of the
parameter estimates would not become arbitrarily small, and variability in
the parameters would contaminate the signal value of money with respect to
output.
The above explanation also applies to a situation where the variables are
nonstationaryandwhereperhapsallvariableswiththeexceptionoftheinterest
rate are observed with error. Whether money will be a useful signal of the
level of income and prices will depend on how precisely it is measured and
how precisely the cointegrating relationship is estimated. Thus, the stability
properties analyzed in the previous section take on added signiﬁcance apart
fromwhetherornotcointegrationexists. Thefactthatthecointegratingvectors
are unstable implies that money may provide a relatively poor signal of prices
7 The signal is a ﬁrst order linear approximation of the regression in equation (1).
8 In the case where ouput is only observed with measurement error, the estimated coefﬁcients
will suffer from the effects of that measurement error as well.32 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
andoutput. However,becausethecoefﬁcientsinthecointegratingrelationship
for M1 seem to be settling down and the rejection of stability was due to
behavior in the early 1980s, the information contained in M1 may be more
useful. In any event, how useful either monetary aggregate is will depend on
the noise in its signal relative to the noise in other signals, such as reported
output, that are available to the monetary authority.
An Error Correction Representation
The central bank may be interested not only in money as a signal, but also in
thegrowthrateofoutputandprices,bothpastandpresent. Examininganerror
correction representation of the demand for money is therefore necessary if
we are to ascertain money’s usefulness in communicating the values of these
variables. We now turn to that exercise.
The error correction money-demand equations that we estimate are
m1t = a0 + b0(cvt−1) + c(L) yt−1 + d(L) m1t−1 − e(L) Rt−1 + ut
(2.1)
for m1 and
m2t = α0 + β0(cvt−1) + γ(L) yt−1 + δ(L) m1t−1 −  (L) Rt−1
−ζ(L)(Rt − RM2
t ) + ut (2.2)
for m2, where cvt−1 is the error correction term. The m2 equation includes an
additional term capturing the opportunity cost of holding balances in M2 that
payexplicitinterest. Wealsolookedatthepossibilityofincludingpolynomials
in time, but they were found to be insigniﬁcant.
Using these equations we ﬁrst ask if money demand was well explained
at any given point in time. We do this by estimating 15-year rolling windows
of money demand regressions and looking at the standard deviation of the
residuals of those equations over 4 years.9 We use rolling windows because
of the voluminous amount of research indicating that these regressions are
unstable over time. Later we conﬁrm this instability. The results of this
exercise are depicted in Figure 2, where the dates on the horizontal axis are
the end dates of each sample period. Although we run the error correction
modelsusingrollingwindows,wearriveattheestimatesoftheerrorcorrection
terms, cv, recursively; the latter make use of all the available data up to the
end date of the sample.
9All regressions are run using the robust errors routine in RATS, which corrects the standard
errors of the regression coefﬁcient when there is autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the errors.Dotsey, Lantz, Santucci: Conduct of Monetary Policy 33
Figure 2 In-Sample RMSE
This experiment shows how well the money demand regression explains
the recent behavior of money. A benchmark is included that shows the errors
occurring in a simple autoregression of money along with the error correction
term. It is clear in the top panel that the ability of equation (3) to explain m1’s
behaviorvariesovertimewithstandarddeviationsrangingfromapproximately
40 basis points to 90 basis points. The early and mid-1970s reﬂect the best34 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 3 Coefﬁcients in m1 Rolling Regression
performance of the regression and it is not surprising that this would be a
period when monetary policy responded to M1 (see Hetzel [1981]).
Panel 2 of the ﬁgure examines M2’s performance. Here the standard
errors are slightly higher using m2 than m1. Also, the standard errors are
relatively small at both the beginning and end of the sample, indicating thatDotsey, Lantz, Santucci: Conduct of Monetary Policy 35
Figure 4 Coefﬁcients in m2 Rolling Regression
the m2 relationship was less variable in the 1970s and is currently fairly well
behaved.
Aswementionabove,thesignalcontentofmoneyisrelatedtothestability
and the precision of the various coefﬁcient estimates in the money demand
regression. Thevalueofthecoefﬁcientsandtheirtwostandarderrorbandsfor
the m1 regression are displayed in Figure 3. We do not display the constant36 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
since its value is small and insigniﬁcantly different from zero. If we exclude
the end of the sample, the coefﬁcients for the most part appear fairly stable.
Thisstabilitywaslargelyconﬁrmedbytheresultsofatime-varyingparameter
regression, but that regression did indicate statistically signiﬁcant variation in
the coefﬁcient on theT-bill rate. We conduct a more formal test for stability in
the presence of an unknown sample break using Andrews’s (1993) sup Wald
test. This test is basically similar to the SupF tests conducted in the previous
section. To perform it, one constructs a Wald test for parameter constancy at
each point on the interior of the data sample. A test statistic for the supremum
ofthesevaluescanbecalculated,ascanthestatistic’scriticalvalues. InFigure
5, we graph the test statistic and the 5 percent critical value. The test rejects
stability, with the rejection of stability arising from large values of the Wald
statistic in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Between 1974 and 1993, the test
statistic is below the 5 percent critical value.10
In Figure 4, we examine the behavior of coefﬁcients in the M2 regression.
Thecoefﬁcientsontheerrorcorrectionterm,theT-bill,m2,andtheopportunity
cost all show statistically signiﬁcant variability. The coefﬁcients on the last
threevariablesﬂuctuateinthe1990s,butthishigh-frequencyvolatilitydidnot
have much inﬂuence on parameter estimates obtained using a time-varying
parameter procedure. However, the Andrews test for stability (lower panel
of Figure 5) does reject stability of the regression coefﬁcients with the Wald
statistic jumping above the 5 percent critical value in 1987.
Theimplicationsofthisexerciseforusingmoneytohelpimplementpolicy
are decidedly mixed. For example, at times the demand for money appears to
bewellbehaved, implyingacloselinkbetweenthebehaviorofmoneyandthe
behavior of nominal output. At other times money demand is less predictable
and the relationship appears unstable, implying that money may not be pro-
vidingaccurateinformationaboutthebehaviorofnominalincome. Giventhis
inconsistency and the desirability of following a simple and transparent rule
of behavior, the central bank might reasonably decide not to use money in a




of future variables such as expected future inﬂation.11 In that regard money
may communicate useful information about these variables. It is to this issue
that we next turn.
10 Given instability and lack of signiﬁcance of time in the full sample regression, we do
not report any estimation using recursive procedures. It turns out that the in-sample errors using
recursive regressions are similar to those of the rolling window regressions.
11 Two recent articles that advocate such policies are Svensson (1999) and Amato and
Laubach (2000).Dotsey, Lantz, Santucci: Conduct of Monetary Policy 37
Figure 5 Results ofAndrews’s Test for Structural Break
3. THE PREDICTIVE CONTENT OF MONEY
In this section we examine whether money has any useful predictive con-
tent for real GDP, nominal GDP, and inﬂation. As discussed in Dotsey and
Otrok (1994), when the Fed uses an interest rate instrument that does not
feed back on monetary variables, there may be a presumption against ﬁnding
that money would Granger cause any of these variables. That presumption,
however, is based on a number of restrictive assumptions, including the accu-
rate observability of output and prices, that money balances do not serve in
some buffer stock capacity, and that money demand shocks do not result from
improvements in ﬁnancial technology having signiﬁcant effects on resource
constraints. If observations on output and prices occur with signiﬁcant lags
and are subject to measurement error, then contemporaneous observation of38 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
money will be useful in solving the signal extraction problems faced by eco-
nomic agents who are not completely informed. Therefore, observations on
money will inﬂuence both agents’and the monetary authority’s decisions and
could help predict economic variables. Also, if agents accumulate money bal-
ances before engaging in expenditures, then large money balances today will
indicatehigheroutputinthefuture. Similarly, ifchangesinvelocityaredueto
technological innovations that are persistent and affect resource availability,
thenobservationsonmoneywillprovideinformationabouttheseinnovations.
An optimizing monetary authority should respond to these innovations, and
hence money will have predictive content.12
Figures 6 and 7 analyze the predictive content of M1, while Figure 8
investigates the predictive content of M2.13 We should note that omitting the
error correction term does at times worsen M2’s forecasting ability. Figure
7 reports the same information regarding M1’s predictive content, but also
includes a time trend in the speciﬁcation. This investigation follows from the
recommendation of Stock and Watson (1989). The assumption that money is
neutral in the long run implies that changes in trend money growth will not
have any long-run consequences for output. In the short run the implications
for changes in trend money growth could easily be quite different from those
for cyclical changes. For example, in a model where ﬁrms change their prices
onlyinfrequently,thebreakdownofhowachangeinmoneyinﬂuencesnominal
income will in general depend on the persistence of the change in money
growth(seeDotsey,King,andWolman[1999]). Ifthechangewasperceivedas
eitherpermanentorachangeintrend,ﬁrmswouldbeexpectedtoaggressively
change their prices, and the change in money growth would have a largely
nominal impact. If the change was temporary or cyclical, the real effect could
be signiﬁcant. By putting a trend term in the forecasting equation, we are able
to isolate the forecasting performance of cyclical changes in money growth.
We also conduct the analysis using 15-year rolling windows; as above,
standard errors are corrected for the presence of heteroskedasticity and au-
tocorrelation. We choose to use rolling windows based on evidence that the
relationships are unstable. Our choice of a 15-year window is based on the
resultsinSwanson(1998), whoﬁndsthat10-yearrollingwindowsmaybetoo
short to give an accurate measure of the effect of money on industrial produc-
tion. We also pick optimal lag lengths for each regressor using the Schwarz
criteria.
12 This is at least one of the theoretical messages in recent research by Dotsey and Hornstein
(2000). Similarly, if money demand disturbances arise from shocks to preferences, the monetary
authority will ﬁnd it optimal to adjust the nominal interest in reaction to these disturbances or its
best guess of these disturbances.
13 The general forecasting model is an error correction speciﬁcation where the growth rates
of real and nominal GDP, as well as inﬂation, are regressed on a constant, an error correction
term, lags of real GDP grouth, lags of money growth, lags of changes in the treasury bill rate,
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Figure 6 Predictive Content of M1
Results for M1
Figure 6 indicates that M1 had signiﬁcant predictive content for real GDP
and nominal GDP during the late 1970s and 1980s, but that it no longer
helps forecast one quarter ahead movements in either of these variables. This40 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 7 Predictive Content of M1 with Time Trend
ﬁnding is consistent with those of Estrella and Mishkin (1997) and the 6 lag
speciﬁcation of Stock and Watson (1989), but differs from the latter’s 12 lag
speciﬁcation and from the results reported in Friedman and Kuttner (1992).
With 12 lags, Stock and Watson do not ﬁnd that nominal M1 Granger-causes
realoutputovertheirsample1960:2to1985:12. FriedmanandKuttnerdonot
ﬁndevidenceofGranger-causalityoverthesample1960:2to1990:4;however,Dotsey, Lantz, Santucci: Conduct of Monetary Policy 41
they do ﬁnd predictive content for M1 over the subsample that ends in 1979:3.
ThedifferencebetweenourresultsandthoseofFriedmanandKuttnerislargely
due to two main differences in our methodologies. One difference is that we
ﬁnd m1 and y to be cointegrated, and we therefore include an error correction
term in the speciﬁcation. The other is that we optimally select lag lengths; we
generally end up with lags on M1 that are less than three quarters and often
pickonlyonelag. Also, welookatrollingwindows, butarecursiveprocedure
produces results that are qualitatively similar. In the early part of the sample,
much of the predictive content is coming from M1 growth, the sum of whose
coefﬁcients is positive and signiﬁcantly greater than zero. In the 1980s much
of M1’s signiﬁcance comes from the long-run or cointegrating relationship of
real m1 with real output and interest rates. Interestingly this coefﬁcient has
a negative sign, which runs counter to the notion that M1 serves in a buffer
stock capacity.
We also ﬁnd that M1 helps predict nominal output through 1995 (see
the middle column in Figure 6). This result is at odds with that reported in
Feldstein and Stock (1994). We also observe that the behavior of M1 does not
help forecast inﬂation (see the last column in Figure 6), which is consistent
with the result reported in Cecchetti (1995).
Adding a time trend to the speciﬁcation does not qualitatively have any
impact on the results, which contrasts with the main message of Stock and
Watson (1989). The contrast, however, could be due to lag length speciﬁca-
tions because only Stock and Watson’s 12 lag length speciﬁcation produces
thesharpdifferencesindetrendedversusrawmoneygrowth. Also,weinclude
an error correction term, which would be picking up long-run relationships
in both speciﬁcations. The inclusion of a trend term, therefore, may not have
as much impact. Indeed, the coefﬁcient on the trend term is insigniﬁcantly
different from zero.
Results for M2
In Figure 8, M2 appears to have signiﬁcant explanatory power in forecasting
real GDP in the 1970s and 1980s, although it is no longer very helpful in that
regard. It does Granger-cause nominal output over most of the sample, but it
does not help predict inﬂation until the very end of the sample (see the last
column of Figure 8). Furthermore, in the regressions on all three dependent
variables, the sum of the coefﬁcients on lagged M2 growth is positive. The
coefﬁcient on the error correction term is often insigniﬁcantly different from
zero, but it happens to be signiﬁcant in just those periods when the sum of the
coefﬁcientsonlaggedM2growthisnot. Thus,addinganerrorcorrectionterm
provides overall help in predicting the three economic variables of interest.
The general lack of statistical signiﬁcance in the error correction term, how-
ever, indicates that there is no compelling evidence that broader money serves42 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 8 Predictive Content of M2
as a buffer stock either. This last result is consistent with that of McPhail
(1999), who analyzes Canadian data.
OurresultthatM2ishelpfulinpredictingthebehaviorofrealandnominal
GDP is consistent with that of Feldstein and Stock (1994), Dotsey and Otrok
(1994), and Swanson (1998), but differs from that of Friedman and Kuttner
(1992). ItisalsonotconsistentwiththeresultsinEstrellaandMishkin(1997),Dotsey, Lantz, Santucci: Conduct of Monetary Policy 43
whoﬁndthatM2doesnothelppredictnominalGDPoverthesample1979:10
to 1995:12 and that M2 does not Granger-cause inﬂation. They use monthly
data, nine monthly lags, and the CPI deﬂator to measure inﬂation, while we
usequarterlydata,theGDPdeﬂator,andvaryinglaglengthsthatareoptimized
for each sample. By looking at a comparable quarterly speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd
that both the presence of an error correction term and the optimization over
lag lengths are responsible for the difference in results.
OurresultthatM2doesnothelppredictinﬂationisatﬁrstglanceinconﬂict
with the results presented by Cecchetti (1995) as well. He primarily looks at
forecast horizons of a year and longer using monthly data, and he ﬁnds that
M2 is signiﬁcant for predicting inﬂation. He also ﬁnds evidence of instability
in the relationship, with the worst predictive performance occurring between
1983 and 1989 although M2 is still signiﬁcant at the 10 percent conﬁdence
level. If, however, we replace the GDP deﬂator with the PCE deﬂator, we
ﬁnd that M2 has signiﬁcant predictive content for inﬂation over the 1990s, but
fails to help predict inﬂation in the mid-1980s. One major difference between
our study and that of Cecchetti is that the latter only includes M2 and lagged
inﬂation in his speciﬁcation, while the former also includes lagged interest
rates and lagged output growth.
As with the results for M1, including a time trend does not appreciably
affecttheresultsofourstudy, sowedonotreportthoseresults. Thereis, how-
ever, one particular change related to forecast horizon that makes a notable
difference in our conclusions: In the context of predicting one-year-ahead
nominal income growth using M2, M2 is always signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcient
on the error correction term is large and signiﬁcant in the late 1980s and
early 1990s—just at a time when the coefﬁcients on lagged M2 growth are
insigniﬁcant. That is the only speciﬁcation in which a monetary variable is
uniformlyinformativeaboutapotentiallyimportantmacroeconomicvariable.
One should not get too excited about this result, however, because the co-
efﬁcients move around a good deal and the relationship, while having good
predictive ability, does not appear to be stable.
Stability
Feldstein and Stock (1994) use a battery of stability tests and ﬁnd that the
relationship between M2 and nominal income is largely stable, although there
may be some parameter instability regarding the constant term. Feldstein
and Stock also indicate that the M1–nominal income relationship is unstable;
Figure 9 is consistent with that result. We again use the Andrews sup Wald
test and graph the p-values for the test of a sample break at each date on the
chart. Figure 10 indicates a rejection of stability for the relationship between
M2 and the three dependent variables, and therefore our results differ from
those of Feldstein and Stock.44 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 9 Results ofAndrews’s Test for Structural Break
4. SUMMARY
We have examined the behavior of both M1 and M2 with respect to their
potential policy usefulness in providing information about contemporaneous
but imperfectly observed variables or in helping to forecast future variables
that may appear in an interest rate rule. As we show, the two notions are
quite different and require different statistical investigations. By and large,Dotsey, Lantz, Santucci: Conduct of Monetary Policy 45
Figure10 Results ofAndrews’s Test for Structural Break
the behavior of money itself is not reliable enough to advocate targeting either
M1 or M2 or including them in a feedback rule. Their predictability varies
substantially over time, and the coefﬁcients in the various regressions we run
do not appear to be stable. M1 and M2 do, however, seem to be useful in
forecasting. Although their forecasting ability varies with time, the periods
over which they often have signiﬁcant predictive content can be prolonged
enough to allow one to ascertain when those times occurred.46 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Even though the relationships we have investigated are not quite stable,
much of their instability seems to be evolutionary in nature. That is, the
changesinparametersappeartooccurgradually. Thisfactsuggeststhatamod-
eling strategy allowing the parameters to vary over time rather than holding
them constant would better explain the behavior of the aggregates themselves
andimprovetheirforecastingability. Thebiggestbeneﬁttoincorporatingtime
variation might accrue from modeling the cointegrating relationship as evolv-
ing slowly over time. Using rolling windows and recursive estimation of the
cointegrating relationship probably does not capture the behavior of money
adequately. Financial innovations affect the behavior of money; these inno-
vations are seldom radical and their adaptation is usually gradual. They are
essentially an unobserved variable in the money demand regressions, and one
hopes that future research will help account for their effects more thoroughly.
Furthermore, regulatory changes such as the elimination of regulation Q
interestrateceilingsonpersonalcheckingaccountsin1981; allowingbanksto
offer MMDA accounts in 1983; changes in capital requirements that occurred
inthelate1980s(seeLownetal.[1999]);andtherelaxationoftheuseofsweep
accounts in the 1990s have each had an impact on the demand for money.
Some of these regulatory changes were no doubt reactions to technological
changes that were taking place outside the banking sector, and thus they may
be thought of as part of some endogenous process. Nevertheless, regulatory
changes often have a discrete and uncertain impact on the demand for money.
Policymakers are well aware of these changes, and modeling strategies can
often be devised to incorporate them into the demand for money function;
many, then, mayviewourinvestigationofmoney’susefulnessasoverlyharsh.
However, incorporatingsuchregulatorychangesformallyintothebehaviorof
money demand often requires a number of years of subsequent data, reducing
the signal value of money during these episodes. For that reason, we refrain
from accounting for the many regulatory changes occurring in the last 20
years. Nevertheless, we view our exploration of money’s usefulness as a
worthy exercise.
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